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ABSTRACT
Title of Research Paper:

Research on Setting up a Performance Evaluation
Regime of PSC in the Asia-Pacific Region

Degree:

Msc

During the past decades, PSC has developed rapidly and achieved series of
remarkable achievements. However, because of the regional mode since its
beginning, there have been lots of drawbacks existing in the current PSC system. For
example, regional development is unbalanced, adopting different inspection
standards. Lack of regional cooperation and data sharing lead to the vessels
inspected repeatedly. Corruption is serious in some developing countries. In this case,
this research endeavors to find out solutions to these problems.

Most of the studies focus on the effectiveness of PSC inspection. Few researches
engage in the supervision of PSC. Therefore, the author sets up a PSC performance
evaluation regime (PSC PER), based on other types of performance assessment
system. After the analysis of the key factors contribute to regime, the framework of
PSC PER can consist of three main index subsets. Each indicator is given the
weighting points by synthesized experts’ opinions. Finally, a BGW-list of PSC
performance appears and classifies the PSC authorities in Tokyo MoU, according to
the historic data.

Two kinds of approaches are used to verify the model of PSC PER. One is the data
of a classification society. Another is to compare two sample groups by the method
of random sampling. Both of them prove the rationality and feasibility of PSC PER.

vii

The application prospect of the regime is discussed in the last Chapter

KEYWORDS: PSC; Regional development; MoU; Performance evaluation; PSC
PER; BGW-list.
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Chapter 1 Introduction

1.1 Background
Today is the time of global economic integration. Each country needs the
commodities from all over the world to develop their economies and people like the
products with high quality made by other countries. However, most of the
merchandise trade still use the seaborne way which has continued for hundreds of
years. Generally, more than 90 percent of the global trade is carried by vessels
(Maritime Knowledge Centre, 2012). The volumes of international seaborne trade had
the total to nearly 9.6 billion tons by 2013, which was about 3.6 times than that ones
in 1970 (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 2014). See Table
1.1. Therefore, the continuous development of marine transportation has driven the
growth of world economy and contributed to the prosperity of markets.
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Table 1.1 Developments in international seaborne trade, selected years (Millions
of tons loaded)

Source: UNCTAD. (2014). Review of maritime transport 2014. Geneva: Author.

Billions of tones cargo transported by sea means the value with billions of dollars
comes from marine industry. As the management agencies, the international
organizations like International Maritime Organization (IMO) and the maritime
administrations from each country own great power, because they make the rules of
game and supervise the running of the industry. However, there are fewer measures
to restrict the power which is owned by the leaders of industry. No one likes a sharp
sword hung on his head; especially the one which is the rule maker. But it will bring
a series of serious problems, if the power is excess and out of control. Some
measures should be used to supervise the function running in the authorities. Port
state control (PSC), as one of the most important work, should be monitored either.

PSC is a kind of ship safety inspection carried out by maritime authorities to the
vessels hung foreign flag, in order to control the safety of vessel and prevent the
pollution to the environment. It is called the second line of defense to eliminate the
substandard ships sailing on the seven seas (Knapp & Franses, 2008), while the flag
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state control is the first line. Even though it develops rapidly in the recent decades
and plays a more and more important role in the shipping industry, there are still
some issues existing in its management system.

Corruption is one of the serious problems. According to the complaint of crew,
corruption of Port State Control Officers (PSCO) widely appears in the Southeast
Asia, South America, East Europe and Africa. They always try to earn the benefits
from vessels by using their power in hands. For example, if the captain pays a
certain amount of money or gives some cigarettes or wine, the PSCOs will issue a
clear PSC report or write less serious deficiencies, which helps the vessel to gain a
good record and reduce the target risk factor in the PSC database. In some countries,
the PSCOs even threaten the seafarers to give more deficiencies, if they can not get
the satisfying reward.

This phenomenon can exist for a long time, because the PSCOs have the great power.
Once the ship is detained due to the detainable deficiencies, it means the vessel may
not deliver the cargo on time and lots of money will be lost. Therefore, the owners of
ship normally have to pay for it.

On the other hand, the authorities in developed regions enhance the safety standards
and implement the strict PSC inspection, in order to fight against the substandard
ships and compel them running out of the regions. However, those ships which are
still able to sail and create the wealth for the owners can change their sailing routes
and operate in the developing regions which do not have the high inspection
requirements. It gives the opportunity for those corrupt PSCOs.

Lack of the unified global PSC organization is the third issue. Various
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Memorandums of Understandings (MoU) were born with PSC. Each MoU has its
target selected standards, inspection requirements, controlling regions. Lack of
cooperation and derecognizing the inspection results of others are parts of the
restrictive factors for the unified PSC organization. There are also other factors like
politics, economy, developed level, etc.

All of these have affected the sound development of marine industry. For instance,
one captain ever complained that the new vessel where he worked received 5 PSC
inspections during the first 6 months after delivery. Because the new ship has no
record in the database of PSC, it should be inspected for safety according the PSC
inspection procedures. The key issue is that each MoU has to check the vessel by
itself and does not accept the report issued by other MoUs.
1.2 Objective of research
Because of the drawbacks existing in the PSC, this thesis is trying to find out a
solution to the relative issues. As mentioned previously, some problems like the
excess power without monitoring will pose a series of serious influence, so a
controlling regime is necessary for PSC. But there is no similar monitoring regime at
present. The author wants to set up a PSC performance evaluation regime (PSC PER)
in Asia-Pacific region.

PSC is implemented by each authority and it presents the sovereignty rights of each
country sometimes. It is not feasible to force each government to do such job as
forbidding the corruption of PSCOs. Therefore, this thesis will select several key
factors and establish a model which is a regime that can be operated regularly. The
model can evaluate the performance of each authority on PSC aspect. Finally, the
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PSC inspection reports of some authorities with poor performance level will be not
admitted. The regime can also promote the authorities enhance their management of
PSC, conscientiously carrying out their duties.

From another point of view, because of pushing the poor PSC management
authorities out of the games, this model will help to eliminate the regional difference
between developed and developing areas, and benefit for setting up a unified global
PSC organization, in order to reduce the insignificantly repetitive inspection and
accelerate the healthy development of marine industry.
1.3 Methodology
Amounts of literature are reviewed beforehand, including IMO documents and
circulars, international conventions, IMO and relative websites, books and articles
related with PSC history and development, a series of researches about the
effectiveness of PSC, some similar performance assessment systems, annual reports
from relative organizations, and so on. All of these are trying to point out the
drawbacks of PSC, introducing the relative research methods and preparing for the
further research.

System engineering method is used to analyze all the key factors related with PSC
performance. Some formulas are set up used for calculating the duty performance
level which is one of the subsets of all indicators. Questionnaire survey to experts
can get the weighting points for each index. Historic inspection data during three
years are analyzed by statistical approach, in order to form the BGW-list of PSC
authorities in Tokyo MoU. The random sampling and group controlling ways are
utilized in the process of verifying the rationality and feasibility of PSC PER.

5

1.4 Structure of dissertation
The dissertation is comprised of 6 chapters. Chapter Two reviews the history of PSC
and its development in recent years, especially focusing on the excellent progress in
Paris and Tokyo MoU. The achievement and drawback of PSC are discussed
respectively. Several similar researches on performance evaluation are introduced,
such as flag state evaluation, IMO performance indicates, maritime safety
administration (MSA) monitoring, etc. Chapter Three mainly analyzes the key
factors which influences the PSC performance, confirming the calculating method of
duty performance level and classifying it either. Chapter Four integrates all the
indicators and gains weighting points for each index from experts’ opinions. And
then, the completed framework of PSC PER can be formed and a classification
regulation of authorities will be introduced. Chapter Five discusses and analyzes the
BGW-list of PSC authorities in Tokyo MoU after introducing historic statistical data.
Two types of approaches are used to verify the model of PSC PER. Finally, the last
chapter makes an overall summary and conclusion, including the highlights and
limitations of this thesis and looking forward to the future research.
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Chapter 2 Review of Port State Control and relative performance
evaluation regimes

2.1 Introductory remarks
There are no effective measures used in PSC monitoring directly in the world. For
one thing, the practitioners in this field are both the performers of rules and the
policy makers. Managers always pay attention to the ones being managed out,
ignoring themselves. For another thing, PSC plays a role of third-party supervision,
which is the last line for controlling the marine safety and pollution prevention. So,
people alwasys focus on the performance of them by using the data of PSC
inspection and neglect the monitoring of PSC.

Therefore, since no straightforward experience learned, it is better to make a
research on the PSC, in order to comprehensively understand for the PSC
development. Finding out the shortcomings will contribute to propose the solution.
Some relative performance evaluation regimes are also referred to, which can give
new ideas for completing the task.
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2.2 The development of PSC
2.2.1 The historic changes of PSC
PSC has a long history carried out in a few of western countries. It only checks the
certificates and documents on board at first, with little international repercussions.
However, the grounding vessel with Liberia flag, AMODO CADIZ, changed the
situation fundamentally. The accident, which caused a spill of 230,000 tonnes crude
oil, polluting the Brittany coast in France, which shocked the Europe and world
tremendously. People considered some authorities of flag states had failed to
perform their duties to ensure their ships to fulfil the requirements of international
convention. For this reason, in 1980, 13 European countries held a meeting in Paris,
reaching a agreement on implementing the inspection to the foreign ships which
wanted to load or discharge cargo in their region. The second conference held in
January 1982 and issued the Paris Mamorandum of Understanding1 (Paris MoU). It
entered into force on July 1, 1982 (Ai, 2003).

Because of the achievement of Paris MoU on controlling the substandard ships, IMO
made a decision to extend this experience. In 1991, the resolution A.682(17)2 ,
Regional co-operation in the control of ships and discharges, had been passed in the
17th IMO Assembly. This resolution asked for establishing similar PSC MoUs all
around the world to reduce or eliminate the running of substandard ships.

Up to now, nine regional agreements of PSC have been set up. See Table 2.1. The
United States does not join any MoUs. Its coast guard (USCG) maintains the tenth
1
2

The Paris MoU covers the EU, parts of Canada and the Russian Federation.
The IMO website gives further information on courses:
http://www.imo.org/OurWork/MSAS/Pages/PortStateControl.aspx
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PSC regime independently. Paris MoU, Tokyo Mamorandum of Understanding3
(Tokyo MoU) and USCG have developed rapidly and owned the largest influence
level in this field （China Classification Society, 2011, p.1）. All the regional
cooperation organizations cover most of places in the world.

Table 2.1 The general situation of various MoUs
No. of
Name of MoU

Issue Date

Region
Members
Europe and the north

Paris MoU

Jan. 1982

27
Atlantic

Tokyo MoU

Dec. 1, 1993

Asia and the Pacific

19

Nov. 5, 1992

Latin America

13

Abuja MoU

Oct. 22, 1990

West and Central Africa

19

Caribbean MoU

Feb. 9, 1996

Caribbean

12

Black Sea MoU

Apr. 7, 2000

The Black Sea region

6

Mediterranean MoU

Jul. 11, 1997

The Mediterranean

11

Indian Ocean MoU

Jun. 5, 1998

Indian Ocean

18

Riyadh MoU

Jun. 2005

Gulf region

6

Vina del Mar
Agreement

Source: Compiled by author (2015)

2.2.2 The current situation of PSC
The coverage of inspection is increasing (Fei & Bao, 2006). At beginning, PSC
inspection normally focused on certificates of crew and main equipments. But, with
3

The Tokyo MoU covers Asia, Australia, Chile and parts of Canada and the Russian Federation.
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the growing requirements of marine safety and pollution prevention, the shipping
companies have to enhance their management and adding the investment. They
should know the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS),
International Safety Management (ISM), the new Annex VI of the International
Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL), Maritime
Labour Convention 2006 (MLC 2006), etc. All of these conventions are involved in
recent years and used for controling the condition of ships. Therefore, the
participants now need to learn more and do more, in order to adapt the changes.

The standards of inspection are stricter. With the development of PSC, the officers
have become more and more professional. For example, the PSCOs from Australia
maritime safety administration (AMSA) always detained ships by only one
deficience which is about the work and rest record. Bacause they discovered the
phenomenon of fake record since the grounding accident of SHEN NENG 1
happened near the Great Barrier Reef due to the long time working of Chief Officer
(C/O) (Australian Transport Safety Bureau, 2010).

The regional inspection regime is becoming completely. Paris MoU started to use
New Inpection Regime (NIR)4 on Jan. 1, 2011. NIR adopted the comprehensive risk
evaluation method to ensure the risk level of vessels. Meanwhile, introducing the
company performance is the highlight, which can promote the company to improve
their level of management. After the running of NIR, the data show each indicator of
inspection is stable, and decreased than before. See Figure 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3.

4

Refer to Directive 2009/16/EC
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Figure 2.1 Number of inspecions of Paris MoU
Source: Paris MoU. (2013). Port State Control annual report 2013. Hague: Author.

Figure 2.2 Number of detentions of Paris MoU
Source: Paris MoU. (2013). Port State Control annual report 2013. Hague: Author.
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Figure 2.3 Number of deficiencies of Paris MoU
Source: Paris MoU. (2013). Port State Control annual report 2013. Hague: Author.

Some regional organizations are strengthening co-operation. As the a successful
regional organization, Tokyo MoU also began to run the NIR5 in Jan. 1, 2014. The
difference between the two kinds of NIR is mainly on the setting of several
indicators. For instance, Tokyo MoU insists more than 5 deficiencies in one
inspection will result in one risk score, while there is no same provision in Paris
MoU. In addition, the Concentrated Inspection Campaign (CIC), which is annually
special inspection, held by Paris and Tokyo MoU together with the same theme in
recent years.
2.3 Literature review of PSC
2.3.1 The achievement of PSC
While the flag state control can not play its role completely, PSC is a kind of
5

The website of Tokyo MoU gives further information on courses:
http://www.tokyo-mou.org/inspections_detentions/NIR.php
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supplement for supervising the ships. Therefore, most of the researches are available
on why and how PSC inspections shall be implemented. In addition, a series of
researches focus on the statistical analysis on the effectiveness of PSC inspection
and the relationship with the casualty.

Kasoulides (1993) emphasizes that the flag stae enforcement has weakened due to
proliferation of open registries. The coastal states have to assert their rights by the
PSC at the regional level. Clarke (1994) points out port states have no other choice
except taking active actions to help themselves, because of the ineffectiveness of flag
states. Kiehne (1996) discusses on whether the sanctions given by PSC authorities
are available to the foreign ships being checked, ranging from instructions to rectify
deficiencies. Cuttler (1995) reviews the PSC in the context of ship pollution
prevention and calls all countries for developing a active framework of PSC to
prevent incidents and pollution before they happen.

Hare (1997) supplies one of the first researches on the effectiveness of PSC, which
indicates the regional cooperation organizations like MoUs contribute on
diminishing the substandard ships. While discussing the iplementation of PSC in UK,
Odeke (1997) explains that PSC improves maritime safety and pollution prevention
and slowly eliminates the substandard ships which have the unfair advantage
associated with operating cheaper. Payoyo (1994) carrys out an assessment of PSC
regime based on the annual data generated by Paris MoU from 1982 to 1992. The
result shows PSC has been a conditional success. On the one hand, the substandard
ships continues to thrive in the shipping market, even though there is the inspection
regime. On the other hand, it is a significant achievement that the baseline data
collecting from the substandard ships in the region can increase the effectiveness in
the enforcement of international standards and more regional co-operation which
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result in the better utilization of maritiem safety enforcement resources.

During the past decade, people used the inspection data to analyse the effectiveness
of PSC, especially the relationship between PSC inspection and casualty. Knapp
(2007, 2008, 2011) presents a series of thesis on this theme from economic
viewpoint, such as the different effects of various ship safety inspection, the effect of
PSC inspection on the probability of casualty, the incident cost savings in shipping
due to inspections. According to his research (See Figure.2.4), for a certain vessel on
average, the inspection effect is clearly the strongest for very serious casualties.
Hanninen (2014) pays attention to the same field. He analyses the PSC inspection
data for finding out the interactions between the various types of deficiencies and the
marine traffic accidents which ship is involvement in by using the bayesian network
modeling.

Figure 2.4 Effect of inspectioin on probalility of casualty
Source: Knapp, S., & Franses, P. H.(2007). Econometric analysis of the effect of
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port state control inspections on the probability of casualty can targeting of
substandard ships for inspections be improved?. Marine Policy, 31 (4),
550-563.

Another research also proves the effectiveness of PSC. Some experts focus on the
reduction in the number of deficiencies after a PSC inspection. They analyze 874
repeated inspections and find out the reported deficiencies during next inspection
decreased by 63%, following a previous PSC inspection (Cariou et al., 2008).
2.3.2 The drawback of PSC
Even though the PSC develops rapidly and gains series of remarkable achievements
on the marine safety and pollution prevention during the past decades, many
disadvantages are also apparent.
2.3.2.1 Political factors
PSC is a kind of beneficial supplement to the traditional flag state control inspection
system. However, it is unavoidable to be a tool of political struggle among countries,
which is the same like with the IMO instruments. For instance, the NIR, which is
firstly promoted by Paris MoU in 2011, is for the purpose of stricter inspection to the
substandard ships. But to some extent, it reflects the political interests of European
Union (EU). EU is aiming to force its influence on other flag states, recogniazed
organizations (RO) and ship companies by using the NIR of Paris MoU (Fu & Zhou,
2011). This is a convert aggression to the maritime rights of other countries.

On the other hand, port states can detain the ships which do not comply with the
requirements of international convention. But sometimes the detention is not carried
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out due to politics. For example, the relationship between two countries is tense.
They detain ships of each other by using PSC instrument, while no detention
happened between two close countries. A country may conduct a improper detention
in revenge for its ship normally detained by another country. Sometimes, PSC has
combined with the political agenda. Singapore once appealed for one PSC
detention made by China Maritime Safety Administration (MSA), strongly asking
for changing the action code and cancelling the detention record. Because Singapore
needed a clear detention record when IMO Voluntary Member State Audit would be
conducted that year.

Another example can prove this viewpoint either. Before Augest 2004, the detention
rate of Chinese fleets in Japan was abnormally much higher than other countries or
regions. China MSA made the utmost efforts to fight for its point of view,
compelling Japan government to sign the bilateral agreement with China on the
detention issue. Then, the detention rate of Chinese fleets came back to the rational
level in the following 5 months (See Table 2.2).
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Table 2.2 Comparison of the number of detentions in China fleet between 2001
and 2004
Around the
world

Asia-Pacific
region
(a)

Japan
(b)

b/a (%)

2001

27

23

19

82.6%

2002

15

14

13

92.9%

2003

21

16

14

87.5%

9

8

88.9%

6

1

16.7%

2004 (January
to July)

17

2004 (Augest
to December)

Source: Chen, C., & Zeng, X. M. (2006). Existing Problems in PSC and Its
Development Tendency. Navigation of China, (4), 78-81.

2.3.2.2 Unbalanced regional development
Though the procedures of port state control6 provide a clear legal basis and unified
inspection standard, the different backgrounds of politics, economy and culture and
the different understanding of inspection requirements cause the unbanlanced
regional development among the countries and regions. For example, Some
developed countries in Europe and North America have the better performance of
implementing international conventions and PSC inspection than the developing
countries and regions (Fei & Bao, 2006). One of the reasons is the inspection
standard which they implemented is stricter. And then, the old ships are evicted out
of their regions. But in fact, these substandard vessels are still operated in the market,
6

Referring to Resolution A.1052 (27).
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just changing routes to the developing regions where have relaxed inspections.
Therefore, unbalanced regional development can not help to eliminate the
substandard ships and improve the progress of the whole shipping industry.
2.3.2.3 Lack of regional cooperation and data sharing
Due to the unbanlanced regional development, the inspection results in some regions
are not admitted by other MoUs, and the data are kept by themselves. Therefore,
some substandard ships will move to another region after detained in ones, in order
to escape from the black inspection record. In a sense, the vessels with poor
condition gain the living room due to this regime. From another viewpoint, the new
or well managed ships have to face the repeated inspection when they sail from one
region to another, because of no data sharing and approved inspection results. So, the
phenomenon of 5 inspections in 6 months for one ship can appear as mentioned
before. Up to now, The only public database that share the information is Equasis7,
but the data is not used for risk evaluation or judge the effect of inspections (Knapp
& Franses, 2008).

There was no regional cooperation until recent years. Paris MoU and Tokyo MoU
enhance the cooperation, uniting to carry out the CIC and starting to adopt the
similar NIR early or late. It is a good beginning for the PSC globalization. Regional
cooperation can promote to use the resources effectively and organize the
inspections with similar standards, in order to form the global monitoring net for
protecting safe sailing and preventing environmental pollution.

7

Equasis is a web-based database which combines data on port state control from three regimes but does not
allow any statistical analysis of the data.
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2.3.2.4 Human factors
Human factor is always a puzzle in marine industry. IMO8 and many experts have
paid attention to this issue for a long time. However, they mainly focus on human
factors related to ship operation and marine casualties. However, human factors are
also a problem existing in PSC.

(1) Capacity
PSCOs should have professional capacity, enough qualification and adequate
training (IMO, 2011). They should have the knowledge of ship construction,
equipments, operation, etc. However, some PSCOs in developing counties are just
graduated from marine colleges, without seaman experience and complete
professtional training. So, sometimes they can not find out the serious deficiencies
during inspection. It is reflected by PSC inspection results. For example, one ship
gets a clear report at first port, and then dosens of deficiencies appear on the report at
next port.

(2) Power
PSCOs have strong power which can determine whether a vessel can be detained or
not. The action codes used for rectifying the deficiencies can be used by PSCOs in
freedom. Because sometimes it is really blurry on the differences between action
code 17 (rectified before departure) and 30 (detention). Therefore, for some
detainable deficiencies, PSCOs can issue action code 17 without any limitation. In
this situation, some corruptive PSCOs have the opportunity to ask money or gifts for
themselves from captains. In some countries, clear report is a bargaining chip in
8

The IMO website gives further information on courses:
http://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/HumanElement/Pages/Default.aspx
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PSCOs’ hands which can be exchanged for bribe.

(3) Emotion
Attitude determines everything, which is said by a PSCO from Singapore. Actually,
it is correct to some extent. PSCO is human being firstly, and then he is an officer.
He can be affected by his emotion. Therefore, the attitude of crew may changes the
result of inspection. For instance, if the captain is very arrogant, interrupting and
even refusing the normal inspection without any acceptable reason, PSCOs normally
will carry out a strict inspection. Conversely, if the ship has only a few minor
problems and crew cooperate with the PSCOs’ inspection, they may get a clear
report in the end.
2.3.2.5 Loopholes of regime
More power in PSCO’s hand is one leak of the regime. Hard work with poor reward
is another issue. In Hong Kong and some developed region, PSCOs are the middle
class, and the salaries are good enough for them to have a decent life. But in some
developing countries, PSC department is part of government which pays less than
the company. Therefore, the PSCO may corrupt, and he may do not work hard in the
limited inspection time. In addition, PSC is a sort of selective check. PSCO normally
inspects the general condition of ships, while the surveyor from classification society
has to check all around the vessel and then issue the certificates. So, the inspection
report is not reliable sometimes.

Even though there are many researches (e.g. Liu & Zhang, 2003; Wang, 2003) on the
legal liability of improper detention which is caused by PSC, ship owners still lack
effective approcaches to appeal or review the incorrect PSC inspection results. On
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the one hand, they are worried about the revenge from PSCOs. On the other hand,
they may pay more cost and time for the review than the payment they get back
(Chen & Zeng, 2006). Therefore, up to now, there are only a few cases that ship
owners sue the PSC authortities for the loss caused by false detention.
2.4 Literature review of relative performance evaluation regimes
The purpose of this thesis is to establish a PSC performance evaluation regime in
order to solve parts of the drawbacks existing in PSC as mentioned above. However,
author does not find out any researches about this regime. This bar introduces some
other performance evaluation regimes and similar systems that can be referred to.
2.4.1 Flag state performance evaluation regime
Port state is called second line of marine safety, because it is the supplement and
supervision of flag state. So, the performance of flag fleets can be reflected from the
results of PSC inspection (For example, Table 2.3).
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Table 2.3 Port state inspections per flag

Source: Tokyo MoU. (2013). Port State Control annual report 2013. Tokyo: Author.

The first flag state performance regime, Black/Grey/White List (BGW-list), was
introduced by Paris MoU and was adopted by Tokyo MoU later. The BGW-list is
published every year and compiled using a specific method 9 . It classifies the
registries into three groups which are black, grey and white. Black list means flags in
it perform significantly worse than average and white list show some flags which
perform significantly better. Table 2.4 shows black list of flag states in Paris MoU.
In the new recast EU directive4, BGW-list becomes one of risk factors in NIR10
which is calculated the weighting point using to measure the risk level of ships.
Because of this, a registry needs to be in the white list. Since its introduction, the
BGW-list becomes the benchmarking standard for flag performance in shipping
industry, even if it is only applied in each region.

9
10

Refer to Port State Control annual report of Paris MoU (2013, pp.58-59)
Refer to the table 1 of annex 7 in the Paris Memorandum
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Table 2.4 The black list of flag states in Paris MoU

Source: Paris MoU. (2013). Port State Control annual report 2013. Hague: Author.
The main duty of flag state is to manage its fleet, so BGW-list regime can be used
for evaluating its performance. However, this kind of system which only focuses on
the inspected results of ships can not be applied on PSC directly, because lots of
other factors need to be considered.
2.4.2 IMO performance indicators
In 2010, IMO published its Organization’s Strategic Plan (IMO, 2010) for the
Organization (for the six-year period 2010-2015), which includes performance
indicators (PI) and key performance indicators (KPI). These indicators utilize
statistic data to measure the performance of IMO, with the aim of achieving the
following (IMO, 2010):
.1 safe shipping;
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.2 secure shipping;
.3 environmentally sound shipping;
.4 efficient shipping;
.5 sustainable shipping;
.6 adoption of the highest practicable standards;
.7 implementation of instruments; and
.8 capacity-building.

Table 2.5 shows all the 20 PIs, which are all the main duties of IMO and can
evaluate the working effectiveness of Organization. This kind of comprehensive
performance evaluation regime can be referred to when the PSC assessment system
is set up. Table 2.6 and Table 2.7 indicate the PSC detention rate and PSC
non-compliance rate which are two of PIs. It means they are the key elements when
PSC work is evaluated.

Table 2.5 The performance indicators of IMO
1: Accession to Conventions

11: PSC detention rate

2: Entry into force

12: PSC non-compliance rate

3: Implementation and compliance

13: Fraudulent certificates

4: Lives lost

14: Delivery of technical assistance

5: Ships lost

15: Sustainability of ITCP

6: Security failures

16: Cycle time

7: Piracy and armed robbery

17: IMO's role

8: Ship-generated water pollution

18: Goal-based standards

9: Ship-generated air pollution and CO2

19: Work of other UN bodies

emissions

20: Efficiency of shipping –
facilitation of international maritime
traffic

10: Environmental conscience
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Source: IMO (2010).

Table 2.6 Performance Indicator: PSC detention rate

Source: IMO (2010).

Table 2.7 Performance Indicator: PSC non-compliance rate

Source: IMO (2010).
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2.4.3 Safety management performance assessment for MSA
Some researchers from China and Norway carried out a research on safety
management performance assessment for MSA (Zhang et al, 2014). They used
Belief Rule-base (BRB) and generalization of traditional BRB theories (G-BRB)
methodologies to assess the performance of one MSA in China. These methods
focus on experts’ opinions using questionnaires to weigh the factors which are
divided into two groups: safety situation and cost. Figure 2.5 gives their framework
for MSA performance assessment.

Figure 2.5 The framework of research on the MSA performance
Source: Zhang et al. (2014).
Because of lack of relative historical data, the factors exclude economic loss,
pollution, etc. Consequently, it is not a completed analysis of MSA performance
assessment. However, using questionnaires to get experts’ opinion is a good method.
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2.4.4 New inspection regime
As mentioned in this thesis, NIR is a system used for selecting the proper target ships
which PSCOs need to inspect. This new regime evaluates the ships from many
aspects, such as type of ship, age of ship, the performance of flag, RO and company,
deficiencies and detentions, etc. Based on the proper criteria, ships are given the
weighting points. All of them together calculate the risk level of vessels. Appendix A
shows the ship risk profile of Tokyo MoU which has a little difference from that of
Paris MoU. In general, this is an excellent method to assess targets, because of the
comprehensive, objective and reliable results.

However, there are some shortages like no weighting points for IMO audit now. In
addition, some corruptive PSCOs can threaten the captains by issuing more
deficiencies, because one weighting point is calculated when the deficiencies are 5
and more. It will also reduce the number of detention and deficiencies.
2.4.5 IMO Member States Audit Scheme
Even though IMO adopts a series of measures to supervise its Member States on
implementing IMO instruments, such as formulating more international convention,
introducing ISM system and flag state performance self-assessment form (SAF), etc.
(Li & Qiu, 2007), the substandard ships are still running in the shipping industry.
Therefore, an external audit regime is necessary to be introduced, in order to enhance
the implementing effectiveness of IMO instruments.

The voluntary IMO Member State Audit Scheme is introduced in the 24th Assembly
meeting in 2005 by two resolutions: IMO Instruments Implementation Code and the
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framework and procedures of voluntary IMO Member State Audit Scheme11. In
2013, IMO’s 28th Assembly meeting adopts new Instruments Implementation Code
(III Code), paving the way for the scheme to be mandatory by 2016.

This audit regime is intended to provide a comprehensive and objective assessment
for all the Member States and evaluate their obligations and responsibilities as flag,
port and coastal States under IMO instruments. It can also offer the necessary
assistance for them to meet their duties fully and effectively. For example, according
to the requirements of III Code, a port state should exercise their certain rights and
obligations under various international instruments. It needs to complete its relative
national legislation, sending proper inspectors who are authorized, qualified and no
commercial interest with any aspects. All of these regulations are for the purpose of
enhancing the implementation of IMO instruments.
2.5 Concluding remarks
Chapter 2 is a literature review for the final target of the thesis. The history and
development of PSC can help us understand the current situation. Meanwhile, with
the evolution of PSC for decades, it really gains the achievements to some extent,
which plays an important role in attacking the substandard ships with high
effectiveness. However, some drawbacks, like political and human factors,
unbalanced regional development, lacking regional cooperation, etc., have appeared
and showed the challenges either which should receive attention and overcome by
practitioners.

It also reveals the purpose of setting up a PSC performance evaluation regime, which
11

Referring to A.973(24) and A.974(24)
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aims to solve parts of shortages. Because of no same regime running in the maritime
field, some relative performance assessment systems are really valuable to be studied
and used for reference. Author lists the evaluating regimes for IMO, MSA, IMO
Member States, flag states and vessels. According to all of them, a new system for
assessing the PSC is forming, which should be comprehensive, objective and reliable,
with the evaluating factors from all the aspects, especially the statistics and analysis
of inspection data. These key indicators will be introduced in the next Chapter.
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Chapter 3 Analysis of key factors in the PSC performance
evaluation regime

3.1 Introductory remarks
Due to the mature regional organizations (MoUs), it is hard to establish a worldwide
PSC performance evaluation regime immediately. However, it is feasible to set up
this system in one region like Asia-Pacific area where exists Tokyo MoU. In this vast
region, Member States have different cultures, histories, politics and economic levels,
so the PSC development is also unbalanced. It means the assessing factors of PSC
should be considered comprehensively. This Chapter will use the system engineering
method to classify all the possible elements which may affect the PSC performance.
And then, defining the key factors and confirming relationship among them. Some
statistical method will be adopted.

Generally, it is necessary to assess one target on both internal and external sides. For
one PSC authority, the internal indicator is the self-condition like the management,
human resources, and so on; the external indicator is normally the evaluation index
from outside. As mentioned in the previous chapter, some PSC inspection data are
used for measuring the work of IMO. And the main duty of PSC is to inspect the
vessel, in order to ensure the safety and prevent pollution. Therefore, the duty
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performance of PSC should be considered. To sum up, three subsets belong to the
PSC PER according to author’s opinion. See Figure. 3.1.

PSC PER

Internal Indicator

Duty performance level

External assessment

Figure. 3.1 Three factor subsets of PSC PER
Source: Compiled by Author. (2015).
3.2 Internal Indicator
The purpose of this subset is to assess the internal management level of one PSC
authority; so many factors have to be considered. Some of them are listed as follows:

1. Coverage. In one country, PSC authority normally has a headquarters and several
regional offices located at ports. Therefore, whether PSC inspection can cover all the
regions in this country is the first matter to be concerned.
2. Legislation. Some national laws should support and authorize to carry out the PSC
inspection on foreign ships visiting its ports.
3. Quality system. Whether there is a quality system working in PSC department or
not? If there is, some documents have to be checked for assessing the running
condition of the system.
4. Procedures. The PSC inspection procedures of IMO should be implemented.
5. Human resources. The recruitment criteria and qualifications for PSCOs engaged
in port state need to be evaluated.
6. Data. The inspection data from annual inspection report of MoU can show the
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working performance of one PSC authority. It can also give the comparison with
other countries in the same region.
7. Self evaluation. The PSC authority should carry out the self assessment annually
and continual improvement.

All above are parts of the internal factors which can be used for assessing the
performance of PSC authorities. Compared with the items in IMO Member States
Audit, it can find that most of them are the same. Therefore, based on the idea of
using the current resources and data completely, IMO audit result can take the place
of the factors evaluating the internal management level of PSC authorities. In
another word, the performance of internal indicator in the thesis depends on whether
the country has passed the IMO audit.
3.3 Duty performance level
The duty performance level can not judge the PSC inspection level completely, but it
can weigh whether the PSCOs try their best to finish the duties and how hard they do.
A quantitative model will be set up in this bar for measuring the duty performance
level of PSC authorities. As mentioned earlier, PSC detention rate and
non-compliance rate (inspections with deficiencies rate) are two key indicators about
PSC in IMO’s Strategic Plan. In addition, the number of deficiencies in one
inspection are important either, not only it is a factor using for determining the ship
risk level in NIR, but also the limitation for PSCOs. For example, a country can
increase its non-compliance rate easily by issuing the reports with only one or two
simple deficiencies. But if the number of deficiencies becomes one of the indicators,
the quality of inspections can be ensured. Therefore, it can calculate the duty
performance of PSC by these three factors (See Figure 3.2).
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Duty performance level

Detention rate

Numbers of deficiencies in
one inspection

Non-compliance rate

Figure 3.2 The system of duty performance level
Source: Compiled by Author. (2015).
3.3.1 Definition
In order to quantitatively evaluate the duty performance of PSC, this thesis
introduces the ship detention rate, ship deficiency rate, the number of deficiencies in
one inspection, regional detention rate, regional deficiency rate, regional number of
deficiencies in one inspection, PSC detention level, PSC deficiency level, PSC
deficiency level in one inspection and PSC duty performance level. In addition,
because of few deficiencies and detention found in follow-up inspection, the total
number of inspection is expressed by the number of initial inspections. All of them
are defined as follows:

1. Ship detention rate

A
Fdet

means dividing the numbers of detention in one PSC

authority by its number of initial inspections in a fixed period time (36 months).
2. Ship deficiency rate

A
Fdef

means dividing the number of inspections with

deficiencies in one PSC authority by its number of initial inspections in a fixed
period time (36 months).
3. Numbers of deficiencies in one inspection

A
FIdef

means dividing all the

deficiencies found by one PSC authority by its number of initial inspections in a
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fixed period time (36 months).
4. Regional detention rate

R
Fdet
means dividing all the numbers of detention in the

region by all the numbers of initial inspections in a fixed period time (36 months).
5. Regional deficiency rate

R
Fdef

means dividing all the number of inspections with

deficiencies in the region by all the numbers of initial inspections in a fixed period
time (36 months).
6. Regional number of deficiencies in one inspection

R
FIdef

means dividing all the

deficiencies inspected in the region by all the number of initial inspections in a fixed
period time (36 months).
7. PSC detention level

A
means dividing detention rate of one PSC authority by
Ldet

regional detention rate in a period time.
8. PSC deficiency level

A means dividing deficiencies rate of one PSC authority
Ldef

by regional deficiencies rate in a period time.
9. PSC deficiency level in one inspection

A means dividing one PSC authority’s
LIdef

numbers of deficiencies in one inspection by the regional ones in a period time.
10. PSC duty performance level

LA

means the sum of PSC detention level, PSC

deficiencies level and PSC deficiency level in one inspection.
3.3.2 Calculating method
There are 19 members in Tokyo MoU and all the related data can be got from annual
reports of Tokyo MoU. However, Marshall Islands joined Tokyo MoU in recent
years and entered the data into Asia-Pacific Computerized Information System
(APCIS) since 2013. Therefore, author only calculates the data of 18 countries
without Marshall Islands. Table 3.1 is a model to show how to calculate the each
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factor.

Table 3.1 The calculating model of port state inspections carried out by
Authorities (36 months).
Numbers
No. of
of
No. of inspection
No. of
deficiencie
initial
s
No. of Deficiency Detention
deficiencie
s related
Authority inspection
with
detentions
rate
rate
s
with
s
deficiencie
(f)
(b/a%)
(f/a%)
(e)
individual
(a)
s
ships
(b)
(e/a%)
C1

a1

b1

e1

f1

C2

a2

b2

e2

f2

C3

a3

b3

e3

f3

…

……

……

……

……

C18

a18

b18

e18

f18

18

Total

A=

∑ ai
i =1

18

B=

∑ bi
i =1

18

E=

∑ ei

18

F=

i =1

∑ fi
i =1

……

……

……

Region
(B/A%)

Region
(F/A%)

Region
(E/A%)

Source: Compiled by Author. (2015).

According to the definition in last bar, each formula shows as follows:

A b
Fdet
= ×100%
a
A
Fdef
A
FIdef

(3.1)

f ×100%
a
e
= ×100%
a

=

(3.2)
(3.3)
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18

∑
R B i=1
Fdet
= = 18
A

bi

ai
∑
i=1

×100%

(3.4)

×100%

(3.5)

18

∑ fi

R = F = i =1
Fdef
A 18

ai
∑
i=1
18

R
FIdef

∑
E
=1
= = i18
A

ei

ai
∑
i=1

×100%

(3.6)

A
Fdet
A
Ldet = R
Fdet

(3.7)

A
Fdef
R
Fdef

(3.8)

A =
Ldef

A =
LIdef

A
FIdef
R
FIdef

(3.9)

A
A + LA
+ Ldef
LA = Ldet
Idef

(3.10)

Actually, formula 3.1 to 3.3 present the inspection situation of each authority from
four aspects, deficiency, detention and deficiency number in one inspection and
formula 3.4 to 3.6 show the regional average level. Formula 3.7 to 3.9 are the
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comparison between one authority and regional average level.

Obviously, when inspection level of one authority equals the regional level, the
results of formula 3.7 to 3.9 are a constant which is one. In ideal condition, when
A
R
A = LA
Fdet
= Fdet
, Fdef
def

,

R = LA
FIdef
Idef

,

LA =3.

It means the average duty

performance level over the region is 3.

While the duty performance level of one authority is higher then the regional average,
it illustrates the PSCOs in it work hard and have better duty performance.
Conversely, it needs to discuss. Because if only the authorities performing higher
than the average are accepted, it means others are encouraged to issue more
deficiencies and detain more ships, which is out of the basic objective of PSC.
Therefore, author proposes to classify the results, referring to the BWG-list which
shows the white, grey and black list of flag states’ performance. In ideal condition,
the performance level of one authority is a constant 3. In this case, all the results
which are over 2 can be accepted. And then, the outcomes between 1 and 2 means
these authorities have to enhance their effort level and perform their duties better.
Finally, for those under 1, they should be warned and disposed combining with other
factors. The classification is showed in Figure 3.3.

Warning Encouraged

0

1

Accepted

2

3

Figure 3.3 The classification of duty performance level
Source: Compiled by Author. (2015).
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3.4 External assessment
Both the internal indicators and the duty performance level are the judging methods
basing on the actual working situation of PSC authorities themselves. However,
some voices from outside can supervise the internal running and promote the system
to improve. For instance, the customer satisfaction is one of the most important
reasons for the success of company Apple Inc, although it has the excellent products.
Therefore, external assessment is essential for PSC PER.

Three factors can be introduced: result of questionnaire survey, successful appeal
rate, responsible casualty rate (See Figure 3.4). Questionnaire survey is to send the
questionnaire to ship owners, companies, crew, etc., asking the feedback of PSC
inspection. For example, whether the PSCOs demand for money, cigarettes, or other
reward? Do the procedures of PSC inspection follow the IMO documents? Are the
PSC reports issued and left on board after the inspection? All similar questions can
be asked, and the answers will be collected. The statistic data are a kind of
viewpoints to show the PSC performance.

External assessment

Questionnaire survey

Successful appeal rate

Responsible casualty
rate

Figure 3.4 System of external assessment
Source: Compiled by Author. (2015).

Appeal is the second aspect. Appeal is an approach for ship owners and management
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companies to explain and argue for the deficiencies and detentions on which they
have different opinions. However, according to the appeal procedures in Tokyo
MoU 12 , this process is firstly handled by the authorities which issue the PSC
inspection reports. Therefore, ship owners or crew always conduct this procedure by
the way of on-site or email discussion. Few real legal actions are taken by them, due
to worry of revenge. At present, this appeal procedure has been implemented strictly
in some countries, even though it is not fair enough. In 2012, 30 appeals accepted by
AMSA and none of them succeeded. One detention lawsuit finished in the same year,
and AMSA won (Yang & Yang, 2014). In China, the appeal procedures were
uniformly processed by China PSC sub-committee where located at Tianjin MSA
since 2013. 15 appeal cases were finished and the results were accepted by both
inspectors and ship owners and adopted by Tokyo MoU secretariat13

The third point of view is responsible casualty rate. Although there are many
researches on the relationship between PSC inspection and casualty, it is almost not
an overall statistics on the casualties caused by the negligence of PSC inspection. In
China, an investigation will be carried out after one accident happened on whether
the flag state control officers (FSCO) missing the serious deficiencies which results
the tragedy. However, there are also no comprehensive official statistics about this.
In fact, the purpose of PSC is to prevent the incidents and pollution. If the PSCOs do
not perform their duties seriously, it is no meaning of their existence.

Overall, all these three factors can reflect the PSC performance from the view of a
third party. But some puzzles are in front of the roads. First of all, there are no
12

13

The Tokyo MoU website gives further information on courses:
http://www.tokyo-mou.org/inspections_detentions/appeal_procedures.php
Data came from unpublished internal documents of Tianjin MSA.
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comprehensive official statistic data for using. Secondly, the authenticity of the data
can not be ensured if they are from the authorities themselves. Thirdly, it is lack of a
feasible and reasonable procedure.

Therefore, it is necessary to set up a special agency to finish this external assessment
as a third party. The employees in it can send the questionnaires, following the data,
verifying the truth of the data, accepting and judging the appeal cases, etc. Finally,
after collecting all the effective data of these three factors, a system of external
assessment can be established. The method of confirming duty performance can be
used here. The data of each authority is utilized for the comparison with the average
level and measure their performance from external viewpoint.
3.5 Concluding remarks
This chapter introduces the factor subsets of PSC PER, which are internal indicators,
duty performance level and external assessment. All the relative indexes are
analyzed and set up the subsystems by using system engineering method. Firstly,
several internal indicators are explained and discussed, finding out the common
points with IMO Member State Audit. Final conclusion is IMO audit results can be
instead of the internal indicators in general. Secondly, a model is established for
judging the duty performance of PSC authorities after analyzing the relative factors
basing on the researches of other similar regimes. Three grades are set up to classify
the different duty performance level. Finally, author discusses the external
assessment, analyzing the three key elements, introducing the difficulties existing in
the current system and proposing a proper solution. All of these are prepared for the
next chapter, which is going to set up the PSC PER.
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Chapter 4 Setting up the PSC performance evaluation regime

4.1 Introductory remarks
Basing on the relative literature review and analysis of all the key factors, this
chapter focuses on integrating previous researches and establishing the PSC PER.
Three subsets of indicators related with PSC performance will be combined together,
composing the assessing system of PSC performance. And then, experts’ suggestion
will be collected, which are used for endowing the weighting points to each
evaluating index. When the whole framework of PSC PER is constructed, some
introductions are needed to explain the scoring mechanism and application. Finally，
a BGW-list for measuring PSC performance can be formed.
4.2 Factors integration
Three subsets of indicators are introduced into the system in the preceding chapter,
the rudiment of the PSC PER has been formed after integrating all the factors. Table
4.1 shows the structure of this rudiment.
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Table 4.1 Key elements set of PSC PER
Coverage
Legislation
Quality system
Internal
Result of IMO Member State Audit

Procedures
Indicator
Human resources
Data
Self evaluation
Detention rate

Warning

Deficiencies rate

Encouraged
Duty performance

Duty
Number of

level

Performance
deficiencies in one

Accepted

inspection
Questionnaire survey
External
Successful appeal rate
Assessment
Responsible casualty rate
Source: Compiled by Author. (2015).
4.3 The distribution of weighting points
15 experts’ opinions are collected by questionnaires. 7 of them are the PSCOs
engaging in PSC inspection for more than 5 years, while 3 ones serving in shipping
companies as managers, 3 captains and 1 professor from a maritime university.
Author asks them for allotting the weighting points to each factor in the PSC PER.
After the statistic data are gathered, the distribution of total score 10 is indicated as
follows:
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Figure 4.1 Weighting points of three factor subsets

Internal
Indicator

Duty
performance
level

2

5

External
assessment
3

Source: Compiled by Author. (2015).

Figure 4.2 Weighting points for three classifications of duty performance level

Warning

Encouraged

Accepted

0

2.5

5

Source: Compiled by Author. (2015).

Figure 4.3 Weighting points for indexes of external assessment
Questionnaire
survey
1

Successful
appeal rate
1

Responsible
casualty rate
1

Source: Compiled by Author. (2015).

All the experts have the same recommendations, using the results of IMO Member
States Audit Scheme to replace the factors of internal indicator. And most of them
(13 experts) give 2 weighting points on this index. The divergence appears in the
allocation of the weighting points between duty performance level and external
assessment. PSCOs insist to allot more scores on the former, while the managers of
shipping companies and captains prefer the latter. After several discussions, the
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balanced results are concluded as above.

In the subset of duty performance, the authorities which receive the accepted
evaluation can gain the full scores, whereas 2.5 for the encouraged group. Those
which play poor duty performance have to be observed for one year and allotted zero
score during this time. In the subset of external assessment, if the authorities have
excellent performance on each factor, they can get the points. Otherwise, nothing
will be given.
4.4 PSC PER
4.4.1 The framework of PSC PER
Combining the key elements and weighting points, the framework of PSC PER can
be got as Table 4.2. However, as mentioned previously, a special agency as a third
party is needed to collect data and carry out the external assessment, which does not
exist at present. Therefore, the score of this category is supposed as 2. Then the
temporary model of PSC PER will be used in this research (See Table 4.3).
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Table 4.2 The framework of PSC PER
Authority
Subsets

Key factors

Weighting

Internal

IMO Member States Audit

2

Duty

Warning

0

performance

Encouraged

2.5

level

Accepted

5

Questionnaire survey

1

Successful appeal rate

1

Responsible casualty rate

1

Score

External
assessment
Totally score
Source: Compiled by Author. (2015).

Table 4.3 The temporary model of PSC PER
Authority
Subsets

Key factors

Weighting

Internal

IMO Member States Audit

2

Duty

Warning

0

performance

Encouraged

2.5

level

Accepted

5

Questionnaire survey

1

Successful appeal rate

1

Responsible casualty rate

1

Score

External
assessment
Totally score
Source: Compiled by Author. (2015).
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2

4.4.2 The classification of PSC performances
Like the BGW-list for measuring flag state performances and three categories used in
the duty performance, it is better to classify the authorities, which can distinguish
between the different PSC performances easily. The BGW-list for PSC performance
shows in Figure 4.4. The authorities with the score 7 and more can be listed in white
list, which means better performance, while score 5 to 7 in the grey group needed
more efforts. The ones performing under the score 5 are in black list, which have to
be observed for a period of time (one year). After that, if the performance has still
not improved yet, the inspection reports issued by them should not be admitted any
more and it is better to kick them out of the family of PSC.

Black

0

Grey

5

White

7

10

Figure 4.4 The classification of PSC performance
Source: Compiled by Author. (2015).

According to this classification, all the three factor subsets are important. For the
authorities getting zero weighting point on duty performance, they are in black list
unless all 5 other marks obtained. However, it is almost impossible due to low
deficiency and detention rate resulting high casualty rate. For the ones with 2.5
scores on duty performance, they have to pay more attention to other two categories
and enhance their inspections. Even though some ones grab all the 7 weighting
points on IMO audit and duty performance, they can not stay in white list without
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annoyance. The third Party will release the data of external assessment to the public.
If they exchange more deficiencies and detention reports without any limitation for
high scores of duty performance, the endless appeals will beat them down.
4.5 Concluding remarks
The whole chapter is for the purpose of setting up the PSC performance evaluation
regime. Following the preceding researches, all the key factors are integrated, and
combined with the weighting points which are the summarized results of experts’
suggestions. The framework of PSC PER is one of the pivotal achievements in this
thesis. However, it has to utilize the temporary one in the following discussion,
because of lack of some important data. To classify the PSC performance of different
authorities is the fatal solution for cleaning the PSC team. Then next chapter will
introduce the statistic data, discussing and verifying the rationality and feasibility of
PSC PER.
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Chapter 5 Discussion and verification of the PSC PER

5.1 Introductory remarks
Even though the framework has been established according to the theory research
and analysis, it still can not be used for judging the PSC performance directly. Data
verification is an essential procedure, which can support the achievement coming
into practice. This Chapter will introduce the relative statistic data from annual
reports of Tokyo MoU and other approaches to discuss the performance of each
authority. Some comparison data will be used to verify performance results. Finally,
the conclusion of whether the feasibility of the model of PSC PER can be got.
5.2 Data introduction and statistics
5.2.1 Information of internal indicators
As mentioned before, the internal indicators are replaced by results of IMO Member
State Audit. However, the data of whether the 18 authorities of Tokyo MoU passing
the audit can not be collected, because it is not the released information, just like
what is said in frequent asked questions of Paris MoU website.

This information is distributed by an internal IMO Circular which is not publicly
available. Individual States may decide to make the information publicly available,
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but there is no requirement to do so. States are invited to inform the Paris MoU
Secretariat as soon as an audit has been concluded. However, according to
paragraph 12 in Annex 7 of the amended memorandum, the Paris MoU Secretariat
will maintain on the Paris MoU public website an up-to-date list of flag States which
meet the flag criteria for a low risk ship. Accordingly flag States figuring on this list
will all have been through the voluntary IMO Audit and will be a white listed flag.
----Paris MoU14

Author searches the internal documents of IMO through the database of IMO
Documents (IMODOCS), finding nothing except the latest progress report on the
implementation of the audit scheme (IMO, 2015) which introduces the countries
planning to audit in 2016 and 2017. But other progress reports never show the name
of countries passing the audit, only the total numbers. It is conjectured the
information is protected due to the voluntary policy, until the audit scheme becoming
mandatory by January 1, 2016.

Therefore, it has to determine the results of audit by other approaches. According to
the explanation of Paris MoU, 6 countries in Tokyo MoU are confirmed passing the
audit by checking the low risk ship list. But as they said, some countries are not in
the list even though they pass the audit, because of other drawbacks. Two countries,
Papua New Guinea and Vanuatu, do not get through the audit, because they are on
the auditing plan in the next two years. For others, the results are unknown on
account of lack of official documents supporting and assumed not passing the audit.
14

This is the answer for the question “Will it be possible to see on the public website of the Paris MoU a list of

States which have undergone the Voluntary IMO Member State Audit Scheme (VIMSAS)?”, which is retrieved
May 27, 2015 from the frequent asked questions of Paris MoU website:
https://www.parismou.org/support/frequently-asked-questions
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The summarized information and weighting points are as follow:
Table 5.1 The results of IMO Member State Audit
Authority

IMO audit

Weighting points

Australia

Unknown

0

Canada

Unknown

0

Chile

Unknown

0

China

Pass

2

Fiji

Unknown

0

Hong Kong, China

Pass

2

Indonesia

Unknown

0

Japan

Pass

2

Republic of Korea

Pass

2

Malaysia

Unknown

0

New Zealand

Unknown

0

Papua New Guinea

Not pass

0

Philippines

Unknown

0

Russian Federation

Pass

2

Singapore

Pass

2

Thailand

Unknown

0

Vanuatu

Not pass

0

Viet Nam

Unknown

0

Source: Compiled by Author basing on relative official information. (2015).
5.2.2 Data of duty performance level
Duty performance level as defined by author mainly depends on the PSC inspection
results. Basing on the inspection data of authorities in the annual reports of Tokyo
MoU between 2011 and 2013, author integrates and calculates the data following the
method in Chapter 3, getting the statistic data showed in Table 5.2 and Table 5.3.
And then, 3 groups are classified, which indicates the different duty performances
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clearly (See Table 5.4). They can gain the weighting points 5, 2.5, 0 separately.

Table 5.2 PSC inspection data of the authorities in Tokyo MoU during 3 years
No. of

Authority

No. of

inspection

initial

s

inspection

with

s

deficiencie

(a)

s

No. of
deficiencie
s
(e)

Numbers of
No. of

Deficiency

Detention

deficiencies

detentions

rate

rate

related with

(f)

(b/a%)

(f/a%)

individual
ships (e/a%)

(b)
Australia

9523

5354

24372

718

0.562218

0.075396

2.559278

15

Canada

1228

717

2508

24

0.583876

0.019544

2.042345

Chile

2664

1150

3006

61

0.431682

0.022898

1.128378

China

24220

20527

140432

2006

0.847523

0.082824

5.798183

Fiji

88

9

16

0

0.102273

0

0.181818

Hong Kong, China

2229

1657

7673

104

0.743383

0.046658

3.442351

Indonesia

7607

2104

9778

180

0.276587

0.023662

1.285395

Japan

15634

10046

50741

659

0.642574

0.042152

3.245555

Republic of Korea

6634

4722

21708

374

0.711788

0.056376

3.272234

Malaysia

2638

1302

5124

53

0.493556

0.020091

1.942381

New Zealand

1284

699

2414

35

0.544393

0.027259

1.880062

Papua New Guinea

278

99

377

8

0.356115

0.028777

1.356115

Philippines

5944

1379

5100

11

0.231999

0.001851

0.858008

3189

2352

12818

69

0.737535

0.021637

4.019442

Singapore

2301

1919

9239

95

0.833985

0.041286

4.015211

Thailand

1288

322

833

10

0.25

0.007764

0.646739

Vanuatu

3

0

0

0

0

0

0

Viet Nam

3821

2332

10459

95

0.610311

0.024863

2.737242

Total

90573

56690

306598

4502

0.6259

0.04971

3.38509

15

Russian Federation

Source: Compiled by Author basing on the data from annual reports of Tokyo MoU.
(2011, 2012 and 2013).
15

Data are only for the Pacific ports
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Table 5.3 PSC duty performance data of the authorities in Tokyo MoU during 3
years
PSC
PSC duty
deficiency
performance
level of single
level
ship

Authority

PSC
detention
level

PSC
deficiency
level

Australia

1.516854

0.898249

0.756044

3.171147

Canada

0.393193

0.932853

0.603335

1.929381

Chile

0.460669

0.689693

0.333338

1.4837

China

1.666288

1.354078

1.712858

4.733224

Fiji

0

0.1634

0.053711

0.217111

Hong Kong, China

0.938678

1.187694

1.016915

3.143287

Indonesia

0.47605

0.441901

0.379722

1.297673

Japan

0.848025

1.026633

0.958779

2.833437

Republic of Korea

1.134199

1.137216

0.96666

3.238075

Malaysia

0.404198

0.788549

0.573804

1.766551

New Zealand

0.548399

0.86977

0.555395

1.973563

Papua New Guinea

0.578947

0.568961

0.400614

1.548522

Philippines

0.037231

0.370662

0.253467

0.66136

Russian Federation

0.435299

1.178352

1.187395

2.801046

Singapore

0.830616

1.332449

1.186145

3.34921

Thailand

0.156199

0.399422

0.191055

0.746676

Vanuatu

0

0

0

0

Viet Nam

0.500196

0.975088

0.808616

2.2839

Source: Calculated by Author basing on the data from annual reports of Tokyo MoU
(2011, 2012 and 2013).
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Table 5.4 The classification of authorities’ duty performance in Tokyo MoU
during 3 years
Accepted

Encouraged

Warning

PSC duty
PSC duty
PSC duty
Authority performance Authority performance Authority performance
level
level
level
New
4.73322
1.97356
0.74668
China
Thailand
Zealand
Singapore

3.34921

Canada

1.92938

Philippines

0.66136

Republic of
Korea

3.23808

Malaysia

1.76655

Fiji

0.21711

Australia

3.17115

Papua New
Guinea

1.54852

Vanuatu

0

Hong Kong,
China

3.14329

Chile

1.4837

Japan

2.83344

Indonesia

1.29767

Russian
Federation

2.80105

Viet Nam

2.2839

Source: Compiled by Author basing on the data from annual reports of Tokyo MoU
(2011, 2012 and 2013).

5.3 Discussion and analysis of the outcome of PSC PER
Basing on method and definition in the preceding chapter, combining with the actual
data and assumption, the scores of the authorities in Tokyo MoU can be seen in
Table 5.5. All the authorities are classified as white and black list. However, there are
no members in the grey list due to the lack of essential information and data. It is
also the reason for lots of authorities listed in black list. On the basis of this situation,
it is better to set an interim period of 3 years before the regime really running. On the
one hand, there is a process for establishing a third Party and collecting relative data.
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On the other hand, IMO audit schedule is fixed and Member States have to be
audited one by one, which needs time.

Table 5.5 The scores of the authorities in Tokyo MoU under PSC PER
PSC duty
External
performance
assessment
level

Authority

Internal
indicators

China

2

5

2

9

Singapore

2

5

2

9

Republic of Korea

2

5

2

9

Hong Kong, China

2

5

2

9

Japan

2

5

2

9

Russian Federation

2

5

2

9

Australia

0

5

2

7

Viet Nam

0

5

2

7

New Zealand

0

2.5

2

4.5

Canada

0

2.5

2

4.5

Malaysia

0

2.5

2

4.5

Papua New Guinea

0

2.5

2

4.5

Chile

0

2.5

2

4.5

Indonesia

0

2.5

2

4.5

Thailand

0

0

2

2

Philippines

0

0

2

2

Fiji

0

0

2

2

Vanuatu

0

0

2

2

Score

Source: Compiled by Author. (2015).

Overviews the outcome above, most of the authorities in white list supported by the
statistic data have an positive evaluation in shipping industry for their excellent PSC
performance. However, even though listed in white list at present, some of them still
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need enhance their management and inspection level. Otherwise, they will be out of
the team immediately after the collection of the completed data.

For those scored 4.5, some of them are suffering the loss of data. And some ones like
Canada and New Zealand have to inspect the vessels with better condition. This is
also a drawback in Tokyo MoU and PSC PER. Because of large range (Asia-Pacific
region) and unbalanced PSC performance level, some authorities which inspect good
condition vessels have to lose marks, while others which have lots of substandard
ships to inspect performing much better than the average and getting high scores in
duty performance. However, as a comprehensive regime, they can not be in the black
list for long time, if the data is collected. Others which also gain 4.5 like Malaysia
and Indonesia need work harder.

The authorities with only 2 marks have to be alert and face the status seriously.
Vanuatu performing weakly can be explained by few ships arriving. But others need
to find out the real causes and overcome them, if they still want to stay in the
organization of PSC.
5.4 Verification on the results of PSC PER
Because of the unbalanced regional development of PSC and the different inspection
standards, it is unfair to compare the PSC inspection data among MoUs. For
example, some substandard ships can be operated in the areas of Tokyo MoU, while
never moved to regions of Paris MoU. Therefore, when the outcome of PSC PER in
Tokyo MoU is verified, selecting the data of similar vessel condition is a proper way.
Two approaches are used in this bar, including the inspection data of classification
society and sample comparison.
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5.4.1 Verification by statistic data of ClassNK
Nippon Kaiji Kyokai (ClassNK or NK) is a ship classification society, which is
engaged in ship-related activities and services aiming at promoting the protection of
human life and property at sea and marine environment. NK has the largest
registered fleet in the world, which owns 8,915 ships over 234.6 million gross
tonnages (GT) under class by the end of February, 2015. See Figure 5.1. The PSC
inspected performance of NK fleet is medium (Nippon Kaiji Kyokai, 2014, p.54),
comparing with other classification societies. In addition, lots of ships inspected and
the extensive distribution of detained vessels from the aspects of ship size, age, type
((Nippon Kaiji Kyokai, 2014, pp.12-14) mean the reliable and fair data. Therefore,
the inspection data of NK can reflect the PSC performance in a sense.

Figure 5.1 Detailed statistics on the NK’s registered fleet

Source: Nippon Kaiji Kyokai. (2015).

Because many ships under NK class are sailing in the Asia-Pacific region, it is
approximately two thirds of the total number of ships detained by the authorities in
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Tokyo MoU. Table 5.6 shows the detention of NK fleet by port sate around the world
between 2011 and 2013. Some authorities like China, Australia, Japan, Republic of
Korea, etc, perform as well as the results of PSC PER. Some other ones like
Philippines and Thailand play a negligible role, even though the former has
sixth-largest inspection numbers in the region every year (See Table 5.7). That is
why they are in the black list of PSC PER.

Table 5.6 Detentions by port state (NK)

Source: Nippon Kaiji Kyokai. (2014).
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Table 5.7 Port state inspections carried out by port authorities of Tokyo MoU
(NK)

Source: Nippon Kaiji Kyokai. (2014).
5.4.2 Verification by statistic data of two sample groups
Some may argue that the authorities like Philippines has high inspection standard
before, which is the same as the ones in Paris MoU. So the poor condition vessels
never call their ports. For this reason, the randomized sampling and grouping control
methods are used. First of all, the first initial inspection record of Philippines found
in the PSC database of Tokyo MoU16 every month from 2011 to 2013 are extracted,
including the information of ship construction time, deficiency and detention, and
ignoring ship information like name, IMO number and call sign. And then, two

16

The public PSC database on the Tokyo MoU website:
http://www.tokyo-mou.org/inspections_detentions/psc_database.php
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inspection records of each ship which are front and rear the one of Philippines are
selected with the same inspection information and the authorities which carry out the
inspection. Thirdly, the inspection data of PSC in China are chosen as a controlling
group. The procedures above are repeated and the information can be summarized.
In addition, if the ship is inspected by the same authorities (Philippines or China) in
these three inspections, its data will be considered ineffectively and wiped out of the
groups. Finally, two controlling groups are shown in Appendix B and Appendix C.
The samples of Philippines are defined as group A, while group B for the ones of
China

Analyzing the data of each group, the conclusion is as follows:
1. Similar distribution of ship age in two groups means no much difference of ship
condition. The PSCOs from two countries are in the same starting line.
2. Group A issues 23 clear reports in the total 26 effective samples of ship, while
group B having only 3 times in the total 20 ones.
3. 11 ships receive the reports without any deficiency in group A, when the
deficiencies appear on both the reports before and after. Only one of these situations
is found in group B.
4. The ship of No.10 in group A constructed in 1999 receives clear report twice after
8 deficiencies issued by Russian Federation. It happens again for the ship of No.21
in group A. Australia detained this ship with 7 deficiencies, and then two reports
issued by Philippines with zero deficiencies. As it shows, the keel laid time of the
vessel was 1984.
5. The sample of No.16 in group B reflects the same decisions on striking the
substandard ships and similar inspection standards. China detained the vessel at first
and Canada carried out the detention once more.
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In the mass, group B shows little difference. But for group A, the large difference
between Philippines and other authorities can not be explained except poor working
attitude and lack of a sense of responsibility. There may be other problems existing
either, like the corruptions which are always complained by crew.
5.5 Suggestions for authorities in black list
The PSC PER can be proved as a rational and feasible method for measuring the
performance of PSC, according to the discussion and verification in this chapter.
Therefore, the authorities in the black list have not any excuses, but to improve their
working performance as soon as possible. Firstly, their governments have to enhance
the management of PSC departments, offering a proper payment and stopping the
phenomenon of corruption, regulating the inspection procedures and seriously
dealing with complaints from ship owners and crew. Secondly, the PSCOs need to
take a correct attitude towards work and enhance the operational capability. When
the agency as a third party is established, it shall copy with the complaints and
supervise PSC performance of authorities in black list.
5.6 Concluding remarks
Basing on the model of PSC PER, this Chapter introduces the historical data, getting
the statistical results and classifying the PSC performance of authorities in Tokyo
MoU. And then, two approaches are used for verifying the model. The data from NK
class proves the distribution of BGW-list of PSC performance is rational and feasible.
The same conclusion is obtained by analyzing the statistical data, using the methods
of randomized sampling and grouping control. Finally, several suggestions are given
to the authorities in the black list, in order to support them to improve their PSC
performance, avoiding to be kicked out of the PSC family.
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Chapter 6 Conclusions

This thesis mainly focuses on the PSC performance evaluation due to a series of
actual puzzles existing in the current PSC system such as unbalanced regional
development, different inspection standards, the great power without proper
limitation, repeated inspections among different MoUs and corruptions, etc. The
PSC PER is a solution which the author is trying to find out for solving these issues.

One of the highlights in this research is to set up a PSC PER which is not a part of
PSC regime as present. Overview of the history and current situation, PSC has
played an important role as the second line, getting lots of achievements on marine
safety and environmental protection. However, there is not a comprehensive and
feasible regime using for supervising the PSC, even though many drawbacks existed
as mentioned in Chapter 2. Besides the PSC, there are many regimes adopted for
measuring the performance of relative organizations, such as BGW-list for flag state
performance, IMO performance indicators, NIR for selecting proper ships to be
inspected, the researches on MSA performance and IMO Member States Audit
Scheme.

Therefore, author wants to establish the PSC PER, in order to regular the chaotic
phenomena of PSC and clear the team. Referring to the relative research methods of
performance evaluation, three factor subsets are constructed by system engineering
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approach, which are internal indicators, duty performance level and external
assessment. Each index under three groups is analyzed and concluded. Finally, the
conclusion is that the internal indicators can be replaced by the results of IMO
Member State Audit. The external assessment should be measured through
questionnaire survey, successful appeal rate and responsible casualty rate. The model
of duty performance level is another highlight in the thesis. After three key judging
elements confirmed, author sets up a model with the calculating method and
classification system.

Following the integration of the subsets, experts are invited to give the weighting
points for indicators. And then, the whole framework of PSC PER is established. The
classification is used once more, in order to distinguish between the different PSC
performances. During the process of verification, historic data are introduced into the
model of PSC PER. And then, BGW-list of PSC performance in Tokyo MoU is
formed. According to the analysis and discussion, two verifying approaches show
the framework of PSC PER is reliable and feasible. Particularly, the sampling
comparison illustrates the huge performance difference of PSC authorities between
white list and black list. Some possible reasons are deduced and several suggestions
are given.

In conclusion, this thesis only researches the PSC performance of Tokyo MoU due to
data difference caused by unbalanced regional development. However, the PSC PER
can be proved to play the role of PSC supervision effectively. This regime can
estimate the PSC performance as a whole, and encourage the authorities to work
harder. Some ones without implementing their responsibilities will be picked and
warned. Otherwise, they should be evicted out of the PSC organization. In addition,
the results of this research can be a preparation for PSC globalization which will be
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the trend in future.

However, there is still a little regret. Because of the lack of effective information and
data, the results of PSC PER are not completed, even though it has a comprehensive
framework. In fact, PSC PER is an ideal model, which has a long way to come into
force unless IMO can promote it. It is a rough road with political struggles between
the authorities with poor performance and the ones supporting this regime. Moreover,
the evaluating system can be detailed and the scoring mechanism may be improved.
All of them are the research to be done in future.

In future, close regional cooperation shall be the trend in short-term. Tokyo MoU
and Paris MoU are the examples, which has enhanced communication and
cooperation in recent years, such as the same themes of CIC and similar NIR applied
one after another. In the long term, a global PSC organization may be established, in
order to unifying the inspection standards and reducing the iterative inspection. A
completed PSC PER can play an important role for overcoming the drawbacks of
PSC system by then.
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APPENDIX B

The inspection sample group of Philippines
Philippines

1
2
3

Once before

Once behind

Keel Deficien Detenti Authori Deficien Detenti Authori Deficien Detenti
laid
cy
on
ty
cy
on
ty
cy
on
Korea,
Australi
2010
4
no
Republi
0
no
5
Yes
a
c of
Malaysi
Indonesi
1984
0
no
2
no
3
No
a
a
Indonesi
Australi
2008
0
no
0
no
2
No
a
a

4

2006

0

no

5

1999

0

no

6

2007

0

no

7

2008

0

no

8

2008

0

no

9

2002

0

no

10

1984

0

no

11

1993

0

no

12

1997

0

no

13

2010

0

no

Vietnam
Australi
a
Malaysi
a
Korea,
Republi
c of
Vietnam
New
Zealand
Russian
Federati
on
Australi
a
Philippi
nes
Indonesi
a

70

4

no

Japan

3

No

8

no

Japan

3

No

0

no

Philippi
nes

0

No

2

no

China

3

No

3

no

0

No

4

no

2

No

8

no

Philippi
nes

0

No

2

no

Chile

0

No

0

no

0

No

2

no

0

No

Philippi
nes
New
Zealand

Indonesi
a
Malaysi
a

14

2006

0

no

15

2008

0

no

16

2008

2

no

17

2009

0

no

18

2008

0

no

China
Indonesi
a
Philippi
nes
Philippi
nes
Vietnam
Korea,
Republi
c of
Philippi
nes
Australi
a

6

no

Malaysi
a

8

No

2

no

Japan

4

No

0

no

Malaysi
a

3

no

2

no

China

10

no

0

no

Malaysi
a

0

no

2

no

Indonesi
a

2

no

0

no

China

1

no

7

yes

Philippi
nes

0

no

Japan

1

no

0

no

0

no

0

no

6

no

19

1981

0

no

20

2008

0

no

21

1999

0

no

22

2009

0

no

Japan

1

no

23

1985

2

no

Vietnam

5

no

24

1997

0

no

Indonesi
a

0

no

25

2010

0

no

Japan

0

no

26

1995

0

no

Philippi
nes

2

no

71

Philippi
nes
Philippi
nes
Philippi
nes
Russian
Federati
on

APPENDIX C

The inspection sample group of China
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